Perils of Militarised Politics
By Kaiser Bengali
The Dawn 3-8-2006

The letter by a group of men and a woman calling for the disengagement of the military from politics is a significant development. The significance of the move does not arise from the contents of the letter, which are fairly mundane. Rather, it arises from the fact that most of the signatories to the letter have earned their distinction by having served on important political positions in military governments.

Understandably, their concerns are not born out of principled angst regarding the violation of the sanctity of the Constitution or of ensuring rule of law based government and polity. Rather, their apprehensions appear to be driven by increasing signs even to those who are close to the corridors of power that the politico-institutional edifice holding the country together is under serious stress.

Unfortunately, the letter is not likely to cause anyone in the President House or in GHQ to sit up and take notice; partly because the group of signatories does not command the required moral stature and, partly, on account of the hackneyed contents of the letter. The fact is that General Musharraf’s occupancy of the positions of president as well as Army Chief of Staff is merely the facade of a set of symptoms and not the cause of the myriad of political problems that Pakistan faces.

The fact is that the country, having freed itself from British colonialism in 1947, has now fallen into the chasm of cantonment colonialism. The fact is that Pakistan has become a praetorian state. This is the fundamental problem that needs to be addressed.

The military’s first foray into politics commenced in 1954 with the appointment of General Ayub Khan as defence minister in the unelected government of Mohammed Ali (Bogra). Since then there has been no turning back. The military has mounted coups and subverted the constitutional process on four occasions in less than 50 years. Its penchant for political power is not without a purpose. When the British colonised South Asia, their objective was to extract surpluses from the local economies to support the development of the metropolis — Great Britain.

As part of the strategy of colonial control, the British acquired — by fiat — large tracts of land running into several hundred square miles for setting up cantonments, establishing military farms, laying railway lines, etc. The governmental machinery and governing institutions were organised with the twin aims of control and revenue extraction.

Even when elected governments were allowed in the provinces, the viceroy reigned supreme. He was only answerable to London and he ensured that the provincial governments, even though elected, did not function in any way contrary to the agenda of the British government. The colonising British prospered to ‘First World’ standards and the colonised South Asians sank into ‘Third World’ penury. The exceptions among the latter were those who chose to betray their people and collaborate with the colonisers. They emerged as the native elite.

Today, the military has emerged as the new coloniser and the colonial framework is back in place. The cantonment is the new metropolis and the civilians have been pushed back to the status of the ‘natives’. The army chief has emerged as the viceroy, reigns supreme and is answerable only to Washington. An elected parliament and government has been allowed, but is constrained to ensure that they do not function in any way contrary to the agenda of the cantonment.

Governance decisions are made according to the will of the military rather than the will of the people. Once again, there are elements among the native civilian elite who chose to betray their people and collaborate with the new colonisers. The colonising military metropolis and the collaborating civilian elite have prospered to ‘First World’ standards and the remaining ‘natives’ have remained in ‘Third World’ penury.

Over the half century since 1954 — except the five and a half years from December end 1971 to early July 1977 — the military has dominated the political and economic decision-making process in the country. New modes of surplus extraction have been developed. An exclusive military corporate empire, with a vast outreach in the economy, has emerged.

The army is the largest land owner in the country. To the vast landholdings has been added a range of industries, trading houses, banking, leasing and insurance companies, transport entities, and housing estates that are epitomes of luxury. Military foundations, a la Fauji Foundation and Army Welfare Trust, run about 55 industrial and commercial enterprises. The National Logistics Cell commands a near monopoly in bulk road transport cargo movements.

Highway construction and highway toll collection are among the many commercial activities that are now largely the domain of the military. Military officers now head organisations in sectors like power generation, communications, highway construction, steel production, etc. There is even a conglomerate of military colleges and universities and hospitals and medical centres. Other universities are often headed by military officers. Retired military officers have emerged in private businesses ranging from urban transport to home security. Private firms too employ retired military officers as public relations officers to benefit from the military’s clout in government.

The Defence Housing Authorities are the largest real estate enterprises in the country, headed by the local corps commanders. That even one minute of the corps commanders’ professional time, paid for by taxpayers money, is devoted to anything other than matters relating to the defence of the country is absolutely unacceptable. And peddling real estate certainly does not in the remotest sense form part of the country’s defence.

The emergence of the praetorian state has been accompanied by a ‘softening’ of the national state apparatus. There has appeared an interface between the military and private interests, with the latter comprising local business houses, some of which are now owned by military families, and multinational corporations, including international financial institutions. Recent events point to the dangerous fact that the state has become increasingly subservient to private interests.

During the last six months alone, there have been three major scandals. The sugar scandal prompted the National Accountability Bureau to launch an investigation, but it was abandoned on the grounds that ‘it is likely to destabilise the industry!’ The government demand that foreign oil firms return excess profits worth billions of rupees on account of failure to pass on the benefits of international oil price reductions to consumers fell silent after the companies threatened to withdraw from operations in the country. And the investigation into stock market manipulations has turned into a hounding exercise against the very individuals who are supposed to reveal the truth.

Under the circumstances, the military’s close involvement in the domain of commerce, industry and finance should ring alarm bells. Herewith, there are lessons from history. Between 150 to 200 years ago, when the British were making inroads into the realm of the crumbling Mughal empire, royal dignitaries, princes and palace officials — charged with the protection of the empire — tended instead to negotiate with the British for the protection of their individual jagirs, allowances and other privileges. A similar situation was witnessed when the British were attempting to take over Sindh.

In Pakistan today, a situation exists whereby military officials have constitutionally assigned responsibility for unconditionally defending the country, have forcibly taken over responsibility for political decision-making, and have developed significant and extensive business interests as well — institutionally through military-owned companies as well as privately. The conflicts of interest are multi-layered and, in addition to causing allocational inefficiencies, could also pose an element of risk to national interests.

Allocational inefficiencies can occur if military corporate entities are able to corner markets on the strength of their preferential access to decision-making forums rather than on the strength of their cost efficiency. This practice is actually widespread and the economic costs to the country are certainly not insignificant. Even the now pervasive practice of appointing military personnel on civilian positions constitutes a contribution to economic inefficiency.

When military officers, trained in the arts of war through an expensive training process, are put to managing real estate, water supply systems, steel mills, fertiliser factories, etc., the result is waste of military resources. Whether those trained in the arts of war are efficient industrial or commercial managers is also a moot point. Clearly, a praetorian state is a contradiction in terms of the objectives of developing a modern state, competing in a globalised economy.

The element of risk to national interests is more subtle. The opening up of the economy has led to several Pakistani companies teaming up with foreign firms to acquire or set up operations in the country. This is true of military corporate entities as well. For example, Defence Housing Authority has set up joint ventures with foreign firms in the realm of real estate development. Other deals could be in more strategic sectors. It is quite likely that a situation may arise where a venture may be problematic with respect to the country’s national economic or political interests. A conflict of interest may arise if the military officials manning the corporate entity command preferential access to military colleagues in the ministries vetting the venture.

The experience of the scandals of the last six months indicates that the state agenda can be compromised. And national interests demand that conflicting commercial considerations do not in any way encumber the military’s ability to maintain a strong defence for the country. The imperative of a strong defence stands heightened today, given the strains on the eastern as well as the western fronts and threats of hot pursuit from across the borders.

The subject about whether the president should be a man in uniform is basic from a constitutional point of view and of paramount importance in the context of a rule of law-based polity. Also vitally important are issues of an independent election commission and free and fair elections. However, these matters now follow from the determination of the fundamental question as to whether Pakistan is to be a praetorian or a democratic state. If it is to be the latter, then the military corporate empire will have to be done away with as a necessary condition for a national interest-based democratic order to prevail.