The deepening contradiction
By: Irfan Husain

As the debate over the army's role in politics meanders along, a recent remark by retired General Aslam Beg in an interview carried in the October issue of the "Herald" drew remarkably little attention. Perhaps we have become so hardened to military intervention that such comments have lost the power to shock.

Replying to a question about the army's and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)'s role in the 1988 and the 1990 elections, General Beg did not reveal anything new, but his justification is nevertheless remarkable. This is the question Musbashir Zaidi asked the former army chief: "The former ISI chief, Hameed Gul, now admits that he created the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad in 1988 to stop Benazir Bhutto's PPP from gaining a clear majority in the elections. Similarly, another ISI chief, Asad Durrani, has admitted to giving money to politicians in 1990. Both of them now claim they did it in the 'national interest.' What would have happened if Benazir had won the 1988 elections with a greater majority?"

Aslam Beg: "The army, perhaps, would not have allowed the transfer of power to Benazir Bhutto. There is a strong feeling in the army that Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was responsible for the East Pakistan debacle and that he maligned the army... So, to ensure that power was smoothly transferred to Benazir Bhutto and democracy restored, the IJI was formed by the ISI. This was done with the clear knowledge that it wouldn't stop the PPP from forming the government... I set up a fake competition by creating the IJI to ensure that a democratic government could be formed... Let me categorically state that the decision to hold on to or relinquish power rests squarely with the army... It would not be out of place to mention that even though the courts do provide moral support to justify army actions, a lingering subconscious guilt continues to haunt those who cause a rupture of democracy..."

Obviously, successive military juntas have been very good at concealing this "subconscious guilt." But Beg's reply, forthright as it is, is more interesting for what he left out rather than what he said. He does not mention, for example, that controlling a government that does not have an outright parliamentary majority - as the PPP didn't in 1988 - is far simpler than a government with a substantial majority. The underlying thrust of his reply is that the army has the right to either wield power directly or pull the strings when an 'elected' government is in power.

At no point in his interview did Beg seem aware of the irony of what he was saying. For example, he sees no contradiction between his repeated use of the term 'democracy' and the army's blatant rigging of successive elections. For him, the 'fake competition' he and his colleagues set up by cobbling together the IJI is perfectly acceptable. Worse, the politicians who accepted large amounts from the ISI have not been disbarred by the Election Commission.

But above and beyond the disturbing questions raised by Beg's comments, there is the larger issue of the army's role in politics. Virtually from Pakistan's creation, generals have dabbled with the country's destiny, weakening democratic institutions as a result. It has almost become a cliche to say that the corruption and inefficiency of our politicians have combined to encourage frequent military interventions. However, it can be said with equal validity that the army has almost never allowed elected governments to function normally. Also, with the exception of the present military government, the press was never free to highlight the graft and incompetence of earlier juntas. Thus, at least in the media, civilians have suffered in comparison to the generals.

It is a fact that the army is the most organized and efficient sector in the country where its own clearly defined duties and responsibilities lie. However, General Musharraf and his colleagues must also realize that they simply do not have the training or the expertise to cure the many ills (some of them caused by their predecessors) that face Pakistan today. Just take the example of the mess our power supplies are in: despite inducting officers and jawans at every level, WAPDA and KESC remain organizational and financial nightmares. Similarly, attaching battalions of retired and serving officers to civilian departments has in no way enhanced efficiency. The only change is that decision-making, never very swift, has slowed down even further.

A soldier spends his adult life in giving or taking orders. His world is insulated from the chaos and bedlam of civilian life. He achieves senior positions in the hierarchy by doing what he is told and efficiently controlling the men under his command. He is discouraged from questioning the orders he receives, and similarly expects those under him to toe the line. In short, he identifies the order around him with unquestioning and uncritical discipline. When he looks over the barracks wall, he sees confusion and inefficiency. Talking to his brother officers in the mess, he complains about the "bloody civilians" and their inability to get their act together.He does not understand that unlike even junior military officers, a civil servant cannot have a subordinate locked up for not carrying out orders. Nor does he grasp the fact that much of the physical and social infrastructures is falling apart because the bulk of the government's resources are going into the defence budget. With his limited understanding of the realities of real life, he is convinced that military discipline will sort everything out. It is only when he and his colleagues take the plunge and take over that they realize that they have stepped into quicksand.

It is about time the army learned that ultimately, it has no solutions to offer, no magic wand to correct all that is wrong with the country. The only solution lies in strengthening civil society and supporting democratic institutions. There are no shortcuts, no panaceas. By constantly meddling in politics, the army not only weakens the system, it ultimately weakens itself. In this day and age, a military government is anathema to much of the world. In Pakistan's context of looming bankruptcy, this translates into a drastic drop in economic assistance and private investment.

The bottom line is that constant overt and covert military intervention has put the country at risk. Ironically, the biggest risk to our security is now internal, and to face it, we need a free and functioning democracy that is not being forever destabilized by generals in the wings. But as the experience of so many countries shows us, there is no inherent contradiction between a democratic dispensation and a strong army.