The world may
look on Abdul Qadeer Khan as a rogue scientist who sold Pakistan's
nuclear secrets in the international black market. But former Pakistan
prime minister Benazir Bhutto remains unconvinced.
In the final part of an exclusive
interview with rediff.com Senior Editor Shyam Bhatia,
Bhutto, who calls herself the mother of Pakistan's missile
programme, admits that she had approached the late North Korean leader
Kim Il Sung for help in missile development. But she also says she had
put in some safeguards against nuclear proliferation and whatever Khan
is alleged to have done could not have been accomplished without the
complicity of General Pervez Musharraf himself. Khan, she says, was
probably sacrificed to protect the general, a man she deeply distrusts
Early this year, Dr Abdul Qadeer
Khan, Pakistan's one-time national hero, was exposed as having been
involved in the sale of nuclear technology to so-called rogue regimes,
sacked from his job as scientific adviser to Prime Minister Mir
Zafarullah Khan Jamali, and eventually pardoned by President Pervez
But former prime minister Benazir Bhutto, whose
father, the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, is acknowledged as the man who
first set Pakistan on the nuclear path, refuses to be taken in.
In an exclusive interview with Senior Editor
Shyam Bhatia, Bhutto claims that
fundamentalist elements colluding with the military regime were actually
responsible for trying to export nuclear technology. According to her,
Dr Khan is just a scapegoat.
Bhutto, who was prime minister between 1988 and 1990
and again between 1993 and 1996, takes credit for introducing a policy
of nuclear restraint that she says was covertly undermined by these
She also reveals how impoverished Soviet scientists
tried to sell enriched uranium to Pakistan in 1990 and how, in the
process of rejecting their offer, she may have alerted vested interests
in her own country to the existence of an international nuclear black
is one of the few people eminently qualified to talk about Pakistan's
nuclear programme. Not only was her father, the late prime minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the moving force behind the project, she herself
was closely associated with it through two terms as prime minister.
In the second part of an exclusive interview with
Senior Editor Shyam Bhatia, Bhutto discloses that
Pakistan not only achieved operational nuclear capability by 1989 but
then cut back on its enrichment programme following intense pressure
from the West.
Can you tell us how Pakistan started its
Actually, India started developing its nuclear
programme in 1961 or '62, maybe even earlier. My father was a minister
in 1962 and he tried to get Pakistan to also start a programme from
The Indians had not detonated anything, but he
negotiated and tried to get material from different countries. He was
able to get a peaceful nuclear reactor from Canada that was put under
Kanupp [Karachi nuclear power plant] inspection. He was also
able to talk to other countries -- I don't wish to go into the names of
those countries -- but he talked to other countries from 1962 to help
Pakistan develop a nuclear programme.
In four years he left Ayub's [military ruler Field
Marshal Ayub Khan] Cabinet. That was in 1966. By the time he came
back to office in December 1971, this was not his priority because
Pakistan had disintegrated and our priority was to first consolidate
residual Pakistan so that it would not break.
In those days there was a lot of talk with Manekshaw [Indian
army chief General S H F J Manekshaw, later promoted to Field Marshal] saying
he would get another present for the Indian people, and the ANP [Awami
National Party of Khan Abdul Wali Khan] was getting support from
Afghanistan, which was blessed by the Soviet Union, to spur secessionist
movements in the Frontier [North-West Frontier Province] and
So we had a lot of other priorities, the main one of
which was to save Pakistan. Therefore my father didn't concentrate on
this nuclear thing. I was then at Harvard, I used to come back for the
In 1974, when the Indians detonated the nuclear
device, my father announced at a press conference that Pakistan will
develop a bomb "even if we have to eat grass."
When did the scientific work start?
In 1974 my father had already got a group of
scientists who had been working on the nuclear reactor and I think it
was the plutonium process. This was in the context of the PAEC [Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission] which he established. Actually, it wasn't
the PAEC, it was still only Kanupp. He established PAEC and he
established Kahuta Laboratories.
So there were laboratories established at Kahuta,
which were renamed A Q Khan Laboratories much later. I knew of it as
Kahuta laboratories by '77, I don't know what it was before.
The main person around it was Munir Ahmed Khan, who
became chairman of PAEC, and my father put together the team of
scientists for this and he followed two paths to nuclear status. One was
the reprocessing plant and he negotiated an agreement with France for a
reprocessing plant and then he did a uranium enrichment plant.
How did A Q Khan get involved?
When he learnt that we were to make the nuclear bomb
and eat grass if need be, he approached my father and offered his
services. He must have flown in, I don't know how he did it. He said, 'I
can assist' and later from press reports it was known that he had been
working and he had some blueprints. Right? But he offered. Maybe because
he was a patriotic Pakistani who, hearing that the prime minister of
Pakistan wanted to make [one], gave his own.
Didn't (then US secretary of state)
Henry Kissinger threaten Pakistan in those days if it went ahead with
the nuclear programme?
He said, 'We'll make a horrible example of you if you
test. Okay?' That was around August 1976. The French did cancel the
reprocessing plant agreement, but the uranium enrichment continued.
At that stage there was this Islamic bomb article and
they started spreading [rumours] that Libya had funded it. I
believe that story was being spread by Zia [Pakistan's military
dictator General Zia-ul Haq] and his intelligence because my
brothers had set up Al-Zulfiqar and they were launching an armed
struggle for the overthrow of Zia's regime. Zia was very scared of them.
His plane had been attacked, his key minister Zahor Ilahi had been
killed. So he was very scared of what they would do and they were the
first people, like the Tamil Tigers, who were prepared to face death but
bow down before him.
I was launching a peaceful movement and a democratic
movement and I had studied in America and had a lot of influential
friends. To discredit us he wanted to say that these people had
connections with Libya and that's where the money came from. But it had
nothing to do with Libya.
I can say 100 percent it had nothing to do with Libya
because, although I cannot say who helped and aided us in our
technological advancements, again for reasons of state, I know who did
and it was not Libya.
You came back to Pakistan in 1986. Then?
I was under house arrest or Karachi prison, Sukkur
prison, Sihala police station, house arrest in different places from
1977 to 1984. I went abroad for medical treatment of my ear, I came back
in '86. I was briefly rearrested.
I first came back in 1985 for Shah Nawaz's [Benazir's
younger brother Shah Nawaz Bhutto who died in mysterious circumstances
in France] funeral. I was arrested, but I was released to go and
attend his magisterial investigation.
Then I came back in '86, then I was again arrested,
and I became prime minister in '88.
Did you keep in touch with all nuclear events
in the intervening years?
No, I didn't. After my father died, I lost all
contact. Those people didn't know me. Munir didn't know me, he knew my
father. In 1988 when I became prime minister I became aware that A Q
Khan and Munir didn't get on... AQ disliked Munir and found it very
difficult to work with Munir. He was junior to Munir.
But when I became prime minister there was a bunch of
scientists who had come to see me. Of course, when I became prime
minister they tried to keep me out of the nuclear loop, even though the
most important issue was the nuclear issue and there was a sense of
paranoia that our nuclear laboratories could be attacked by Indian
planes, or Israeli planes.
Israel had attacked the Iraqi nuclear reactor, so
there was a lot of concern that our nuclear programme would be forced to
roll back and that they could be destroyed totally. I had to deal with
this and when I became prime minister it was one of the first issues I
had to deal with.
It was an issue raised by the United States, it was an
issue that every Western ambassador raised with me -- fears of nuclear
I did not know it then, but now I know that since 1987
Zia had offered to help Iran with a nuclear reactor. This has come in
the press, that he had offered this to or decided on a military
What is now known is that after defeating the Soviet
Union, Zia wanted to defeat America. Everyone in Pakistan used to say, 'Amrika
nay ek kutta pala, Zia-ul Haq uska nala.' They used to say this and
what people don't realise is that in Pakistan at the mass level Zia was
so abused that it was all for the nuclear programme, this was because he
was an American dog. They used to call him 'Amrika ka kutta',
they never called him by his actual name.
He tried to tell everybody that he was not doing it
for America, but for Islam and after defeating the Soviet Union he was
going to defeat America and make
Islam the greatest power in the world.
So somewhere after 1987, according to press reports,
he offered this to Iran...
When you became PM, did the military keep you
out of the enrichment plant at Kahuta?
I don't remember, I really don't remember. I think I
may have been to PAEC, but I don't remember if I went to Kahuta. I would
really have to check the records to see if I went or not. They tried to
keep me out of the nuclear programme.
By bypassing you with papers?
Right, but I put myself in it in December 
because this was the biggest issue. I asked the army chief and he said,
'It's got nothing to do with me, it's the president.' I asked Ishaq
Khan [then president Ghulam Ishaq Khan] and he said, 'There's
no need for you [to know].'
I thought, I'm the prime minister and there's a war
going on, a political war, where the president is trying to say the army
comes under him, security comes under him, the nuclear programme comes
under him. But my party would say no, we have a parliamentary system and
parliament is the elected body and security issues must come before the
parliament and the prime minister is head of the parliament, so she must
be involved in security discussions. Otherwise she becomes a glorified
municipal mayor, which is what Ishaq and the military had Nawaz Sharief [then
opposition leader and later prime minister] saying.
So did you have no contact with the nuclear
I picked up the phone and called Munir, whom I knew
very well, and I picked up my phone and he said who else knows, Qadeer
Khan. They both turned up to see me. So then the president and military
establishment decided they had to deal with me, they could not bypass
the prime minister. Because, while they might say they had no power over
the military, I could sack the scientists and then what would they do?
Or I could take the press into confidence, I could
take parliament into confidence. So then, because I asserted myself, the
president called me up within hours of my calling the scientists and
telling them I want a briefing, where we stand, where are we?
What did the president say?
He said, 'Come, we'll have a meeting together.' So
then we decided to set up a command committee. Originally, the programme
was under the prime minister who was the chief executive. When Zia took
over as president, he kept himself as the head of it because under Zia
the chief executive was the president. So it went to the president and
When I became prime minister, they tried to keep it
with the president and army chief, but later they inducted me and it
became the president, the prime minister, and the army chief. We would
meet at the presidency and, when we wanted briefings on anything, we
would call the scientists.
So in 1988 uranium enrichment was running at
93 percent, which is weapons grade level?
Enrichment was at 93, but we had done a cold test
by... well, we decided about the proliferation and we decided it was
important first to achieve a certain level. So they did a cold test
around January '89.
So that was without the nuclear core?
I don't know how cold tests are done. But they said
before I gave any guarantees to the West, I must have a cold test to see
if everything works.
Between January and March the cold tests were done. I
don't know if they did it in January or they did it several times, or
what they did. But it was completed by March.
Because I told them how many bombs do we need to
destroy civilization? I said who will be left to destroy civilization?
Okay, we need some in case one gets wiped out and another gets wiped
out, some degenerate and something else happens. I said, 'You tell me
how many you need.'
And what did they say?
I don't want to get into that, there are certain
things that I feel I must keep quiet about. So I said whatever you need,
you keep that much. But beyond that we don't need. So we figured we had
enough, we didn't need and we would give the statement that for
confidence-building, to protect our laboratories we would not export.
I could not understand why the Americans were
insisting on exports, that there should be no exports. But they and IAEA
[the International Atomic Energy Agency] -- and there were
meetings in Vienna with my adviser for defence, he was also part of the
So by 1989 Pakistan had an operational nuclear
A stockpile existed by then?
Not only a stockpile but bomb components existed and
it was only a question that we put them together or did not put them
together. So not
putting together the bomb components meant a time lag,
which the West said gave it confidence that nothing would be done
But there must have been huge political
pressure from the West at that time.
As I said, the sense of paranoia that our sites would
be blasted out, our laboratories. Everyone was concerned, even the
military was concerned. The army was concerned, the president was
concerned, the Pressler amendment was there. Soviets were withdrawing by
February and there was concern that as soon as the Soviets withdrew we
would no longer be a frontline state in the fight against Communism. And
that is when our nuclear installations could come under attack.
So we had a very narrow time frame during which we
could actually negotiate to satisfy international concerns.
I didn't want to keep it secret. There was the
question of how do you continue secretly? So I thought that rather than
have a secret or covert programme if we had achieved our security needs,
we could have an open policy of what we had intended to do. So we had
non-intrusive verification because the Americans claimed their
satellites could pick up the volume at which the enrichment plant or the
gas centrifuges worked.
So they could pick up whether we were doing 93 percent
or not. And at the time we were negotiating what I remember is going
from 93 percent to 60 percent. Not going to 5 percent, which is
So there was a kind of cutback in a way, a
In that first period of your prime
So what were these non-intrusive inspections?
That the satellites could pick up the speed at which
the enrichment plant was working so with those revolutions -- because at
60 percent you beat at a certain level and at 90 percent you beat at
Were you surprised by the nature of the
non-intrusive inspections? It must have come as a shock.
I don't know, this is what I was told, you do so many
things in government that the way you retain your memory is to retain
what are the important things. I don't remember who told me, but I was
told the Americans would be able to monitor what we were doing.
So at that stage in 1989 you gave them the
reassurance that you will not put the components together?
And you imposed the voluntary self-restraint
of cutting back to 60 percent [enrichment]?
So the amount, the volume of highly enriched
Yes, so then if you want to make more weapons you have
to take that 60 and go to 90. So you always have the option. What we
said was that so long as our security is not threatened, we will not put
the device together.
So we kept open the option of putting our device
together in the event of what we perceived as a security threat, which
to our minds meant that if India detonated a device we would have the
option of putting it together and, if there was a war, and we felt it
was necessary for our deterrence, we would be putting it together.
So we did not rule out putting it together.
Did you think this was realpolitik or a moral
position you were taking?
It was realpolitik and also a moral position which we
also had long discussions on. There was also the argument made that why
should we give [in to] America, we should try and see what we
can do to disperse our capacity. We do have the uranium one. But I
thought that was too messy and that would involve a whole secret network
of trying to set up alternative laboratories because these were known.
Also trying to shift the materials. I didn't like that. I argued how
many times do we need to destroy each other and at the end of the day
they agreed with me.
In return for our restraint the Americans agreed to
suspend the Pressler Amendment and give us the aid.
Did they do that?
Yes, $4.6 billion was the quid pro quo, whereas under
Zia we got less, we got $4.2 billion for fighting the Soviets. But the
Soviets were gone and we got $4.6 billion and, instead of getting 20 or
40 F-16s that we got under Zia, we got 60 F-16s. They weren't delivered
because my government got overthrown in 1990 and the Americans alleged
that we had crossed the line and that we had gone back to 90 per cent
What about A Q Khan?
A Q Khan and Munir didn't get on, but after
overthrowing me I believe it was in 1990 that they separated them and
made it the Khan Laboratories.
I believe AQ has a huge ego.
But he didn't have a huge ego then. The huge ego only
started from 1990. When I knew him he was a modest man. I first came
across him in 1988 when he came to see me with Munir. They seemed like
government servants ready to carry out government orders. The prime
minister had called them, they came.
In one of his articles published in Hurmat,
Qadir talks about the Partition deaths he witnessed at Bhopal railway
He never mentioned that to me. He offered his services
to my father, that was that.
He talks about how he was mistreated when he
crossed the border from India to Pakistan, mistreated by Indian forces.
I only know that from 1990, around 1990-93, the two
institutions of the PAEC and Kahuta Laboratories were separated. They
were called Kahuta Laboratories, but their name was changed to A Q Khan
Laboratories at some stage. Not under my government, but it was changed.
After my election there was an attempt to woo him and since my father
had made the nuclear device, there was also a need to have a symbol.
I think it was after Nawaz Sharif detonated the
nuclear devices that AQ became 'Father of the Nuclear Bomb.' But
actually everything was done before.
Khan never said anything to you like 'Prime
Minister, we must teach these wicked Hindus a lesson'?
Never. He was quiet, only spoke when questioned. He
would come to me obviously with recommendations. By the time we had
finished with the nuclear -- because we had this agreement -- all that
was left with nuclear was miniaturisation and preservation. And then I
had established the missile technology board.
I can tell you that in 1989 we established the missile
technology board and he [Khan] saw me in that connection, he
had discussions with me in connection with missile development
How did he move into missiles from bombs?
That he would have to answer, but he saw me about it
and Beg [then army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg, above left]
saw me about it and I looked into the subject and I saw we were able to
develop missiles that were short of MTCR [Missile Technology Control
Regime]. So I agreed to develop Pakistan's [missile force].
We were worried because we were dependent on the F-16s for delivery, we
didn't know that the plane could be shot down before it crossed or what
would happen. So we needed missile technology. India had developed its
own missile technology. I developed missile technology in 1989 and I
made certain important decisions with regard to it.
In 1993 when I went to [North] Korea it was
to get their technology to compare it with our technology. But we had
already developed when I was prime minister from 1989 in time for 1997.
I was going to missile-test the Zulfiqar, which after my overthrow was
called the Ghauri and which I thought was real mean pettiness. The world
calls it the Nodong, but it was not the Nodong.
Your second term as prime minister in 1993?
1993 autumn to 1996. I took over when Pakistan was
bankrupt, it was on the brink of being declared a terrorist state, the
first attacks on the World Trade Centre had already taken place. The
Americans had cut off all aid because of proliferation concerns.
Where was the enrichment programme then? Had
it returned to 90 percent?
When I took over they said it had gone down to 5
percent... so obviously somewhere along the time during Nawaz's term --
we were bankrupt, the  World Trade Centre attack had
taken place and we were on the brink of being declared a terrorist state
-- so perhaps in a bid to cool international tempers, they agreed to go
to 5 percent uranium enrichment.
Later you hauled Pakistan out of a crisis?
Yes, the nuclear crisis in the first term and the
terrorism crisis in my second term.
Did you initiate the revival of the nuclear
programme in your second term?
No, I didn't. I called them and asked, 'What line did
we cross?' Nobody could find what line had been crossed. I thought it
unacceptable as prime minister that we should lose the $4.6 billion
package and lose all the F-16s and be isolated because of intelligence
by the US. We never got the 4.6, it was all cut. We got whatever was the
first tranche and the rest was all cut.
There had been a quid pro quo and money had
been released from '89 till 1990. But in the summer of 1990 [US]
Ambassador [Robert] Oakley came to see me and he said they had
picked up some intelligence reports that we are crossing the line. He
didn't define it. I took it to mean that we are back to making weapons
grade uranium. Because in my mind, for whatever reason, it stuck that
they used to verify through the revolutions of the centrifuge.
I told Oakley I would look into it, but he said, 'Not
yet, I'm just mentioning it to you and I will come back to you.' The
following month he came back to me and said, 'Yes, I'm making this
officially.' He was sharing this with me. So then I informed Beg about
it and I informed Ishaq [President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, above right]
and said I want a meeting of the Nuclear Board where I planned to tell
them about it and call the scientists to find out what was behind it.
Ishaq told me, 'You are going abroad on a tour, we'll
have a meeting when you come back.' I was going on a tour of some Muslim
countries in connection with a meeting of some Islamic nations. There
was to be a resolution on Kashmir, the Berlin Wall had fallen, the
Kashmiri people had risen up, and we thought this was a good moment to
press for their political freedom.
The OIC [Organisation of Islamic Conference]
had never passed a resolution on Kashmir, so I travelled to a sea of
Muslim countries between June and July 1990. When I was abroad in July
the US sent a special envoy who I understand was Bob Gates [then
deputy national security adviser to President George H W Bush] --
but this will have to be verified -- he was co-ordinating with the
First of all, they should never have let him come when
I was going abroad because I was going abroad for six months, or three
months, but they called him and then they said 'she's travelling'. Then
they would tell me 'he's coming to see you in Bahrain', or 'he's coming
to see you in Egypt', or whatever country I happened to be in. But he
would never come, or if he would come the meeting would never take
I felt I was a victim of a conspiracy. They were doing
something, I don't know what they were doing, but they did not want me
to call a meeting of that board. They
would not want me to call a meeting of the scientists because I would
find out. So what I think they did was sabotage
that meeting and after having sabotaged that meeting, the meeting never
I went back to Pakistan, I told Ishaq, he set a date
for the meeting at the end of July and one day before he cancelled it
and said it would be in August. On August 6 my government was dismissed.
What happened next?
When I got back into government, I was curious and
wanted to know what [had] happened. They said there was no
explanation. Because of the lack of a satisfactory explanation, I said
this would not do and asked what they proposed. It was then agreed [that]
we would put security inside the laboratories, that we can monitor the
scierntists and ensure the scientists do what they are ordered.
As far as you were concerned, were the
laboratories still enriching at a non-weapons grade 5 percent?
No, it was 60 percent when I left office. But when I
came back to office they had committed to 5 percent. First of all, we
had security outside the laboratories, right? Now we have security
inside the laboratories from 1993 under a major general. So now there is
no way a scientist can do anything independently without being
Your concern was that someone was crossing the
line and you didn't want that to happen?
Yes, they had to follow government policy. To prevent
anybody violating government policy -- one of the explanations given was
that maybe some of the cores had degenerated, and to replenish the cores
the scientists had started enriching.
I said that was unsatisfactory because if the core
degenerated then they must bring it to the attention of the prime
minister and the board and then start, take our permission to redoing it
to 95 percent. But to do it on their own was not right.
Between 1993 and 1996 you did not authorise
the revival of 95 percent enrichment?
No, no. They had given a commitment of 5 percent and
they kept it at that. Although our commitment was at 60 percent. Because
they had brought it to 5 percent, we kept it for confidence because we
always felt that the way to safeguard the programme was through
international confidence and that if the world was frightened of a
Muslim bomb... in the case of India, India was not going to export it
to another country because India wanted it for itself. There was no
Hindu civilisation of pan-Islamic view.
In the case of Israel they were not going to give it
because there was only one Israel. But in the case of Pakistan there was
always a fear that it is going to turn into a replicating bomb that will
be used in a series of countries. So there was a much greater fear about
our bomb, or perhaps there was a greater fear about Muslims because half
the problems are in the Muslim world.
I don't know what was the fear in the world community,
or maybe it was because of Israel. I can't say, but I can say there was
a great deal of insecurity. At the same time, having nuclear status was
a matter of security for Pakistanis and, sadly, though it was a weapon
of mass destruction, it was a matter of pride because people felt we
were as good as India. India had developed one, we had developed one. If
their scientists are good, our scientists are equally good.
So the bomb reassured the national psyche?
In that sense it covered two aspects of the Pakistan
national psyche and for a country that had been disintegrated and had
gone through the horrors of Partition and considered Kashmir under
occupation, this was a saving grace, that we can compete equally with
Is it possible that rogue elements assisted by
the Pakistan military and jihadis started playing around with the
nuclear programme from 1990 onwards?
It is possible, but not probable, for certain reasons.
In 1989 I learned from one of the journalists who was tied to the
elements trying to overthrow my government that those elements were
basically the intelligence, the ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence]
people and MI [Military Intelligence]. They were trying to
overthrow my government, but these people had some journalists very
close to them. One of them planned to take A Q Khan to a Muslim country
and keep him there.
They told him they would take him on a pilgrimage --
it's not Saudi Arabia -- they would go for a pilgrimage and keep him
there. I saw this as an attempt to embarrass me by suggesting that
Benazir Bhutto is anti-Pakistan and
she's a security threat and she's responsible for the disappearance of
our nuclear scientist. So I passed orders that no
scientist could leave the country without government permission. And
That means such scientists could never leave
the country without the government's explicit knowledge?
There was one other thing I may have inadvertently
done [and that] was introduce them to the international
blackmarket. At that time my parliamentarians would come to me in
Parliament House and say they had been approached by Russian scientists
wanting to sell enriched uranium, this was in '89-90. There were Soviet
scientists who were starving, they weren't given their salaries, they
were poor, they wanted to meet me and I didn't want to meet them.
They approached the government, parliamentarians, so
here they come and tell me, 'We don't have to worry if we can't make
uranium, we can buy uranium. Okay?'
I thought it was a trap set up by the intelligence. So
I then sent them to the ISI to investigate.
Unfortunately, if it was not a trap, I introduced the
ISI to the network.
I sent the information to the ISI and I never got a
report back. I assumed it was a trap because I never got a report back.
I remember this incident because it didn't happen just once.
The first time I said 'no, no' and thought it would
die. But it was persistent and when it was persistent I sent it to the
ISl to investigate.
Is this the time Khan started going to Libya
Probably not Libya. I don't know, we need a full
investigation to see whether the president changed the policy or the
army chief defied the intelligence, or the intelligence defied the army
chief, or whether elements of the intelligence bought over by Al Qaeda
joined up with the scientists. We don't really know, all this is
So barring an investigation, my suspicion is that Iran
happened between 1990 to 1993.
Where does Libya fit in?
Libya comes much later when I was overthrown a second
time. Either they offered it to them then or maybe they offered it in my
first term, I don't know. But in February 2000 Musharraf went to Libya.
In July 2000 Musharraf's commerce minister and friend took out a full
page ad offering nuclear related products for sale.
The A Q Khan brochure was also made then. What
happened was that in 1998 we detonated the nuclear device. I was
expecting to be called by Nawaz Sharif and I was expecting to be asked
for my advice on how to deal with the situation. I thought it was time
for Pakistan to take the moral high ground by opening its laboratories
and doing a cold test in front of everybody to say, 'See, we are a
nuclear power', but not doing a hot test. But nobody asked for my views.